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Family systems are among the most enduring and
universal institutions that human beings have de -
vised; in one form or another, they exist in every so -
 ciety as a social arrangement for regulating repro-
duction, supporting the young, and caring for the
elderly. The survival of family systems stems from
their remarkable ability to transform their struc-
ture and practices in response to new demographic,
social, and economic conditions. That the family sys -
tem has persevered despite the vast global changes
of the last century attests to this resiliency and adapt -
ability. But there are a number of indications that the
family’s capacity to perform its traditional functions
is becoming strained as the pace of social and eco-
nomic change quickens around the globe. 
Family formation and childbearing, robust a half-
century ago, have slowed to below population-
replacement levels in most developed nations. Mar-
riage has become a less central and stable institution,
making child care more precarious. The breakdown
of the gender-based division of labor has challenged
women and men to develop more complex routines
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for managing work and family roles. Great -
er parental investment and support is re -
quired for childrearing today: lengthier
and increasingly expensive post-second-
ary education and depressed job prospects
have prolonged young adults’ dependency
on their parents. On the other hand, a rapid
increase in longevity has enlarged the
ranks of the elderly, contributing–along
with the smaller number of the young–
to an increase in their share of the total
population. This adds to the elderly’s ca -
pac ity to assist younger generations,
though at the same time it increases the
future burdens on younger generations to
support and care for elderly family mem-
bers when they become frail and incapac-
itated.
The decline of fertility and growth of
longevity have produced a rapidly aging
society in many parts of the world. This
pattern of population aging will be accen -
tuated as the large cohort of individuals
born after World War II–the baby boom -
ers–reaches seniority. The demographic
pro½le for each wealthy nation differs
depending on the timing of its baby boom
and the magnitude of its baby bust (a
consequence of rapidly decreasing fertility
in the latter third of the last century). Some
are aging sooner or more rapidly than oth -
ers; these nations have provided some in -
sights about the effects of population aging.
(For more on demographic shifts in the
United States, see S. Jay Olshansky’s essay
in this volume.)
Public systems such as Social Security
and Medicare were devised a century or
more ago partly to relieve some of the eco -
nomic and social pressures on the family
–midlife parents in particular–to assume
complete responsibility for the care of both
the young and the elderly. Due to popula-
tion aging, these public support systems
will face considerable pressure in many
so cieties, including in the United States.
Any reductions in public expenditure will
only increase the burden on working-age
adults already challenged by the temporal
and ½nancial demands of supporting the
elderly while simultaneously having to in -
vest more in caring for and educating the
young. In this essay, we explore whether
families will be up to this task. 
We begin this inquiry by briefly sum-
marizing some salient ½ndings on prac-
tices of intergenerational support and ex -
change in economically developed nations.
We will then discuss changing conditions
that are likely to complicate (and possibly
alter or erode) these existing familial re -
lationships and patterns of intergenera-
tional resource allocation. We also exam-
ine coping mechanisms families develop
to accommodate intergenerational needs.
In the second part of the paper, we will de -
scribe the work of the MacArthur Founda -
tion Research Network on an Aging Soci-
ety, which has devised a series of projects
to explore these social is sues linked with
aging societies, and whose work may con -
tribute signi½cantly to the knowledge base
that informs U.S. policy on aging. We con -
clude by considering some possible dilem -
mas that policy-makers may face in their
efforts to support families.
A vast amount of research has been done
over the past several decades on how gen-
erations within family systems support
and assist each other over time. Patterns
of intergenerational exchange operate
quite differently in traditional societies,
developing countries, and advanced econ -
omies. Traditional societies have often de -
vised means of protecting the elderly
generation (G1) by maintaining intergen-
erational households or mandating that
the middle generation (G2) provide ½nan -
cial support to elderly parents, though old -
er parents (G1) may also continue to assist
their adult children by caring for their off -
spring (G3) or working. Two distinctive
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oldest generation 1) does not survive in
great numbers and 2) produces a relative ly
high number of children who can pro vide
support as they come of age. Moreover, low
geographical mobility tends to keep fam -
ilies in the same locale, ensuring that par-
ents will have surviving children around
to provide support when they are no longer
able to take care of themselves.1
This general pattern of an upward flow
of resources from the middle to the oldest
generation typically persists in developing
countries, though due to the expansion of
labor markets, second-generation mem-
bers often move away from their birth com -
munities to seek higher incomes. In inter -
national migration, this may lead to con-
siderable remittances from G2s to G1s. On
the other hand, children may sometimes
have to be left behind in the care of their
grandparents, especially when mothers
move to wealthier countries (often to
become paid care workers for children or
the elderly). The introduction of old-age
pensions–frequently the ½rst step of pub -
lic social assistance–greatly improves the
½nancial position of the elderly and may
lead to a reversal of the ½nancial flow by
enabling them to aid the families of their
adult children and help cover the school-
ing expenses of their grandchildren.2
In nations with advanced economies, the
flow of economic assistance more gener-
ally moves downward. Children and grand -
children require more and longer support
due to extended and more costly educa-
tion and dif½cult transitions into work;
conversely, the elderly are often econom-
ically better-off thanks to public support,
savings, and improvements in health care.
In all European nations, parents continue
to provide more economic assistance to
their children and grandchildren than they
receive (at least through their seventies).
This is true even if we include nonmone-
tary help.3 Children (and possibly grand -
children) often reciprocate by aiding their
parents when they become frail or inca-
pacitated, but are less often called upon to
provide economic assistance to elderly par -
ents (many of whom enjoy the economic
security provided by their social security
bene½ts, pensions, and savings). Those in
need of personal care often ½rst turn to
spouses or partners, but children may also
step in, either as caregivers or as organizers
and monitors of third-party or institution-
al care.
Admittedly, this is an oversimpli½ed pic -
ture of intergenerational exchange in
wealthy countries; there is much variation
both within and across individual nations.
First, the magnitude of public support
var ies greatly among welfare systems. Sec -
ond, countries also differ in terms of the
forms of their support systems (family-
based versus individualized).4 Third, the
flow of resources works differently across
different economic strata. Among the poor
and near-poor, children may be called up -
on to help out both economically and non -
monetarily throughout their lives and can -
 not readily afford to purchase as sistance
for older relatives, as might be com mon
among the more privileged. Fourth, there
is a great deal of evidence showing that ra -
cial and ethnic differences correlate with
dif ferent patterns of support and ex -
change.5 Some ethnic groups are much
more likely to maintain intergenerational
households in which the volume of support
and assistance is more intense and recip-
rocal over time.6 (Interestingly, however,
there is a paucity of evidence on the work -
ings of intergenerational households in
con temporary societies.) Finally, divorce
and remarriage affect the amount of sup-
port provided both downward and upward
throughout the life course. Di vorced fa -
thers not infrequently lose contact with
some or all of their children, who in turn
are unwilling or unavailable to as sist their
fathers in later life. Stepfathers may ½ll in
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that children feel less ob ligated to care for
elderly stepparents than parents.7
As we contemplate a potential retreat of
public systems of assistance for the elderly
in the next several decades, there are sound
reasons to be concerned about families’
ability to pick up the slack. This is espe-
cially true in the United States, where the
population is becoming more economi-
cally strati½ed, more ethnically diverse, and
more varied in its family forms.
Impending demographic change in the
size of elderly and middle-aged cohorts
drives much of the concern about the pres -
sures likely to mount on parents in midlife
and late midlife (roughly ages forty-½ve
to sixty-four).8 These middle-aged parents
(mothers especially) are often called the
“sandwiched generation,” squeezed by the
simultaneous demands of supporting their
children, assisting a frail elderly par ent, and
being in the labor force. Some ar gue that
this term exaggerates the pressure faced by
this generation, because many parents take
active steps to avoid being in this position
or do not have to ½ll all three roles at once.
Nonetheless, it is highly likely that a sub-
stantial percentage of families will face
these circumstances in the next two or
three decades. Though there is little re -
search describing the incidence and dura-
tion of episodes of being “sandwiched” for
middle-aged adults, we know that about
one-third of women in late mid dle age (be -
tween ½fty-½ve and sixty-nine) report giv-
ing support to both children and parents at
some point.9 This is likely to in crease, since
the proportion of adults who have both
children and living parents is rising.10
The number of elderly (including par-
ents, parents-in-law, and stepparents) who
survive to become incapacitated or frail
will increase as the baby-boom cohort
advances into their later years in the next
several decades. This poses a new challenge
for the reconciliation of family and work,
similar to that faced by young parents. At
the same time, unless current patterns of
family formation rapidly reverse–and
there is no reason to expect that they will–
a rising number of young adults will not
begin having children until their thirties
or even later. More than one-third of births
are now to women over thirty, and the
average age at ½rst birth has risen steadily,
from twenty-one in 1970 to nearly twenty-
six in 2012.11 Not all of these young adults
remain dependents while forming partner -
ships and having children, but many do
receive partial or complete support from
their parents in their early adult years. The
proportion of young adults being assisted
by their parents has been steadily rising
over the past several decades.12 Were this
pattern of the prolongation of early adult -
hood to continue, it would result in an even
greater level of “sandwiching,” mandating
that a growing proportion of midlife adults
divide time and resources between their
parents, their children, and possibly even
their grandchildren.
These demographic trends of greater
long evity and later family-formation are
compounded by rapid changes in marriage
practices that have tended to make family
obligations more uncertain. Compared to
four or ½ve decades ago, young adults mar -
ry later and divorce more often, making co -
habitation and remarriage more common
and socially acceptable. Marriage has be -
come a less central institution for organiz -
ing childbearing than it was a half-cen tury
ago; a growing proportion of chil d ren are
born out of wedlock, often into cohabiting
unions (which are less stable family forms,
particularly in the United States).13
We know all too little about felt obliga-
tions to extended kin in varied family cir-
cumstances. Existing evidence suggests
that marriage–especially a ½rst marriage–
confers a greater sense of obligation to in-
laws than do consensual unions.14 Cohab -
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conditional commitment to both the part -
ners and their extended kin. The growing
number of remarriages and cohabitations
after a ½rst marriage may result in weak er
obligations to in-laws and quasi–in-laws,
reducing the level of support to in-laws
that accompanied marriages in the past.
As mentioned earlier, an ever-greater
fraction of children are growing up with
sporadic or limited contact with their bio -
logical fathers (and a smaller but rising
number instead have limited contact with
their biological mothers, or have little con -
tact with either parent). As stated previ-
ously, the evidence strongly suggests that
children with limited contact with their
fathers are–not unsurprisingly–far less
likely to provide assistance to them when
they become elderly.15 A third trend asso-
ciated with family change may also affect
the availability of support for older people
in the future: childlessness has been rising
rapidly in many nations with advanced
economies, including the United States,
where close to one-sixth of all women in
their forties are currently childless.16 For -
tunately, much of the research on this topic
suggests that the childless are not neces-
sarily stranded in old age because many
ac quire surrogate caregivers who may or
may not be kin.17 Nonetheless, the relative
shortage of children among people enter-
ing midlife may eventually reduce the
amount of assistance and care available to
certain subsets of the elderly. 
The constellation of family changes has
not been uniformly distributed; markedly
different family forms exist across the so -
cial strata. As inequality has widened in the
United States and elsewhere, family prac-
tices among the privileged, the disadvan-
taged, and those in the middle have become
more pronounced and distinct from one
another.18
Disadvantaged families are generally
formed earlier, typically outside of mar-
riage, and they are less stable, with less
con tact between fathers and children.19
Fam ily units are more complex, often con -
 tain ing step- or surrogate parents and half-
siblings.20 Coresidence among three gen -
 erations is a common adaptive strategy
for managing economic pressures and the
greater need for assistance by kin.21 At
the same time, the elderly have signi½cant -
ly shorter life spans, suggesting that pres-
sures on midlife parents (often ma tri archs
charged with keeping the family together)
are considerable. Cutbacks in pub lic sup -
port most acutely affect these overbur-
dened families, and it is unclear how par-
ents will be able to invest adequately in
their children while supporting frail par-
ents or grandparents (shorter gen erations
result in more four-generation families in
this segment of the population, owing to
earlier childbearing ages). 
Issues facing the privileged are likely to
be less acute, if only because of their great er
resources for purchasing assistance when
needed. Nonetheless, many will face an
over lap between demands from children
and from elder parents and in-laws. Af -
fluent parents tend to provide high levels of
support to young adult children and at
the same time have parents with relatively
high life expectancies.22 As greater num -
bers of baby-boomers reach old age, afflu -
ent parents will have to contend with the
declining health of their parents and in-
laws while they are still launching their
young-adult children.
Families of modest and moderate means
–the middle third of the economic distri-
bution–face a different situation, at least
in countries with limited social safety
nets such as the United States. They are
squeezed economically because, though
they are ineligible for public assistance,
they may have obligations to ½nancially
as sist their older parents and adult chil -
dren (who may themselves be ineligible
for so cial services). So-called middle-class
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aging society most acutely. It seems likely
that more of these families will adopt the
coresidence strategy of low-income house -
 holds in an effort to pool their resources. 
It is impossible to know how economic
growth and wage trajectories for various
job sectors will mitigate the pressures on
families in different countries twenty or
thirty years out; however, the prospects do
not look especially bright, given that many
advanced economies are struggling to
maintain the robust economic growth
necessary for a good labor market of young
and middle-aged adults that are capable
of helping to support the oldest generation.
Perhaps older persons–who are in better
health than previous generations–will be
more amenable to remaining in the labor
force through their late sixties and early
seventies, both to improve their own cir-
cumstances and to contribute resources to
younger generations.
This much we do know: large parts of
the future elderly are likely to be less af -
fluent than current cohorts of individuals
over sixty-½ve. And, in all likelihood, many
of their children will be less well off in their
middle years than their parents were at the
same age. Young adults today are as well-
educated (or better-educated) than their
parents were, but they are entering adult-
hood with more debt and more modest
labor-market prospects. 
These speculations about the future of
intergenerational relations are informed
by current research, but there are still many
unknowns. The demographic growth of
the elderly population, followed by a far
smaller cohort of younger and middle-aged
adults, is ½xed, but we do not know exactly
how these cohorts will look in another
twenty or thirty years as the baby-boom
cohort ages. They will certainly be more
eth nically diverse, but whether current
trends in economic inequality and family
change will persist is less clear. 
What will the health and economic sta-
tus of future Americans be?  How will the
circumstances of the elderly be affected by
trends in health and disease and changes in
family structure, educational attainment,
and public and family support systems?
The answers to these questions de pend
on a range of alternative future sce nar ios,
each with a different set of costs and ben -
e½ts. Economic and demographic mod el -
ing is a useful tool that provides a simpli -
½ed representation of our future reality.
A team of researchers from the Mac -
Arthur Network in collaboration with the
Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Eco -
nomics at the University of Southern Cal-
ifornia has been building such a model:
the Future Americans Model (fam). fam
is a simulation model that uses data on
groups of Americans over age twenty-½ve
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the Health and Retirement Study in or -
der to understand the short- and long-term
implications of changes across cohorts on
well-being from birth through death. This
model expands on the technical infrastruc -
ture and expertise the researchers devel-
oped while building and using a similar
model, the Future Elderly Model (fem).
Researchers from the Network are also
using the fem to quantify the value of cur -
rent and future intergenerational support
and resource-exchange for Americans aged
sixty-½ve and older. They are simulating
the effects of changes in pub lic assistance
(via Social Security and Med icare) on these
exchanges of money and time across fam -
ilial generations. Look ing forward, the Net -
work researchers’ work will deepen our un -
derstanding of fu ture intergenerational
exchange and support by anticipating fu -
ture changes to the family. 
Part of the challenge of building the Fu -
ture Americans Model is taking into ac -
count the ways in which new family pat-
terns will emerge for each age stratum in
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ily forms is fraught with challenges. For
this reason, the Network has given a grant
to a second team of researchers (headed by
Chris Sepaki and including Andrew Cher -
lin, Emily Agee, and Douglas Wolfe) to
build a framework for exploring how fam-
ily forms may evolve over the decades. Such
changes may also vary over socioeconomic
strata (as well as family forms), affecting
the potential flow of family assistance in
the near future. The team will begin with
different assumptions and an alternate ap -
proach to that of the fam team, using cur -
rent information about the type and pace
of changes in marriage, cohabitation, and
fertility within and outside of wedlock.
Both teams are exchanging information so
that they can determine whether and how
different assumptions about family change
and the growth of inequality may affect
public and private demands for health care
and economic support. In the next year,
they plan to publish the results from these
simulations. 
This information will, in turn, give the
½rst team (which is modeling future pat-
terns of costs and care for the elderly) a
more speci½c and nuanced understanding
of how demands on midlife parents and
their children may overlap with the needs
of the baby-boom generation as they age
and require greater assistance from their
families. 
A third project, supported jointly by the
Network and the Pew Foundation, involves
data collection on a largely unexplored is -
sue: how families in societies with more
advanced population aging–such as Ger-
many and Italy–are managing to deal with
the simultaneous demands of caring for
their children and their elderly parents. The
emphasis is on measuring unmet or par -
tially met needs of individuals in the fami-
ly unit. As we discussed earlier, we an tici -
pate that, in an aging society, midlife par-
ents in particular will face demands for
assistance that are beyond their capacity
to meet them. How do parents respond?
Do they call on additional relatives such as
grandchildren or siblings to help out? Do
they look to public services? Or does the
demand simply go unmet? The Network
will compare the patterns in these already
“older” societies with the circum stances
of midlife parents in the United States. 
To supplement this survey, researchers
supported by the Network will be conduct -
ing in-depth interviews of family mem bers
in a three-generation qualitative study car -
 ried out by human development researcher
Karen Fingerman and her colleagues.23
The aim of this research is to examine in
depth how exchanges of support are initi-
ated and responded to in daily life when the
oldest generation be gins to need more as -
sistance. In research on intergenerational
exchange, very little attention has been
paid to the needs families are unable to
meet and what might remedy this short-
fall. This qualitative re search may help us
understand how and when gaps occur be -
tween the needs of the elderly and the sup -
ply of assistance.
This essay has sketched a picture of a de -
mographic future that may pose consider -
 able challenges for family systems in West -
ern nations that during the twentieth cen -
tury worked to strike a balance between
public and private support. That balance
is likely to change, and the economic and
health costs of supporting the elderly gen-
eration while investing in younger genera-
tions will become formidable over the next
thirty years. We have observed that this task
is like ly to become more complex with the
aging of the baby-boom cohort, changes
in family systems, and the growing strati -
½cation of social classes and ethnic groups.
Despite this essay’s overarching focus
on the problems, there are some silver lin -
ings to the current demographic situation.
The relative paucity of children (G3s) com -
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although seniors will be less ½nancially
well-off on average, there will be a larger
cohort of them to provide assistance to
their children and grandchildren. The ratio
of seniors to grandchildren is likely to soar
in the next ½fteen to twenty years, suggest -
ing the possibility of a greater flow of par-
ent and grandparent assistance before the
older generation requires assistance, by
which point grandchildren may have be -
come a more potent source of assistance to
the elderly. In fact, we know very little
about how flows of assistance to the young
are reciprocated over longer stretches of
time.
We do not dismiss the possibility that sig -
ni½cant social, economic, and demograph -
 ic changes could alter the rather bleak sce -
nario of declining support for the elder ly
that we have projected. Nonetheless, the
American public, unlike its European coun -
terparts, appears to be relatively unaware
of the looming problems facing it as the
baby-boom cohort reaches an ad vanced
age.24 The pressures on an already over-
burdened and rapidly changing family sys -
tem suggest that we could begin to see a
diminution (if not a full reversal) of the
downward flows of assistance from elderly
parents and relatives to younger genera-
tions. Were this to happen, it could restrict
social mobility and become an added
source of inequality in the United States,
which is already among the most so cio -
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